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VALUES IN SCIENCE AND SCIENCE EDUCATION 
by 
Alex C. Michalos 
I am in fundamental agreement with most of Professor Martin's views, I 
think, and will therefore begin my remarks not with a critique of those views but 
with what I take to be further elaboration. 
First, then, besides the analytic and speculative types of philosqphy of 
science, I would recommend a third type which we might call normative 
philosophy of science. It is a species of normative philosophy generally and it 
may be briefly characterized as the view that one of the primary responsibilities 
of a philosopher is to evaluate, appraise or assess whatever it is he is reflecting 
upon. For example, rather than simply analyzing various ideas or concepts of 
scientific expJanation, laws, theories and models, a normative-type philosopher 
of science would try to find good reasons for preferring one analysis of an idea 
or concept to another. His basic assumption about scientific notions is like that 
of Lewis Carroll's Humpty Dumpty-or Jesus Christ's on the Sabbath, for that 
matter; they're made for us, not the reverse. So we should try to make them well 
rather than poorly. We should, for example, specify the characteristics of a 
good scientific explanation so that such explanations do whatever it is we think 
they should do. 
In fact, as we have just s�n in Professor Martin's paper, philosophers who 
seem to want to do nothing more than analyze concepts, frequently end up 
recommending this or that analysis as preferable for one or another reason. 
, 
They end up telling us what we should do, whether or not anyone logically or 
as a matter of fact actually does do that. From the normative-type philosopher's 
point of view, that is exactly what a philosopher should be doing. It is not the 
only thing he should be doing, but it is a very important part of what he should 
be doing. 
Second, I think that there is a shorter path to take to prove that scientists 
as scientists must make value judgments. The argument is just this: In any 
scientific community judgments must be made distinguishing good and bad 
research practices. That's one of the main things a scientist's education is 
about. For examples, one learns to form control and experimental groups; one 
learns that in order to find out what causes what when, one must control c-er· 
tain variables; and one learns that one ought to be very suspicious about the 
conclusions reached from experiments made without adequate controls. In 
short, a scientist learns to evaluate, appraise or assess his own and other's 
research practices. This is one way value-judgments must enter into science; 
scientists as scientists must make such judgments. Unless you take the view 
that there is no such thing as a sloppy, careless, silly, stupid, poor, fallible or 
hack scientist, I don't see how you can reject the view that scientists must 
evaluate their brethren. And that seems to me to be the easiest way to prove 
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that scientists as scientists make value-judgments. 
Third, in order to assess the value of philosophy of science for science edu­
cators, I would suggest beginning with the fact that the needs and wants of 
scientists are not the same as nonscientists. Moreover, science students do not 
have the same needs and wants as nonscience students. This is, of course, an old 
stumbling block for course and curriculum planners, not to mention students 
themselves. No doubt there are people hearing my remarks now who have 
very definite beliefs and attitudes about my assertion. No one will doubt that 
most nonscience students don't want, say, Chemistry I poured down them as if 
they were going to become chemists. We all know what they want: they want 
out! The arguments arise over what they need, some of us saying they need the 
same introduction to science that science students need and others saying 
that they need a quite different introduction. 
The interesting thing about arguments over what people need is that they 
tend to be very much like arguments over what people want. That's because you 
can't decide what anyone needs until you decide what they ought to have to be 
normal or nice, and the latter decision(s) are largely value-judgments. You 
might say, for example, that men need oxygen, but that is only true if you 
assume that the proper, normal or good state for men to ibe in is a living one 
rather than a dead one or a gasping-for-air-until-your-face-turns-blue-one. 
I begin with the assumption that the needs of nonscience students are not 
like those of science students for the simple reason that the ultimate proper, 
normal or good states for both kinds of students are intended to be different. 
The science student is intending to use his science background to earn his daily 
bread, get his kicks and possibly to find what he takes to be a worthwhile niche 
in the world. The nonscience student is intending to survive his encounter with 
science, including its devotees of all kinds, as painlessly as possible. He does not 
intend to make a living on the strength of his scientific expertise or to enjoy 
developing such expertise, and most certainly, he does not imagine that he is 
going to find what he takes to be a worthwhile sort of existence by studying 
science. To appreciate the depth of difference between the aims or motives of 
these two types of students is, I think, tantamount to granting that their needs 
with regard to education in science are quite different. That is why I suggest 
that we begin with this assumption. 
Once this is granted, I think we can make roughly the points about the 
relevance of philosophy of science to science education that Professor Martin 
indicated. I would expect, however, that philosophy of science would be even 
more relevant to the education of nonscience students in science than to anyone 
else. But that, I hasten to add, is an empirical claim which may well be false. 
(At Guelph our students are allowed to opt out of a "straight science" course 
by taking our philosophy of science course instead. They come in droves, about 
120 a term or 360 a year. But we've never run a controlled experiment to find 
out if our course is closer to th�ir hearts, aims or ideas about what they ought to 
get in a university education. We like to think it is close to all these things and 
more, but maybe it's just a way out of "straight science" and maybe that's all 
they want.) 
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Finally, I would like to try to defend a somewhat novel position with respect 
to the problem of the relation of so-called practical values to believing that 
something is true or false. Professor Martin's position, you recall, is that such 
values cannot be relevant to believing that something is true or false. My view is 
briefly that such a position is at best question-begging, and at worst pointless 
and highly misleading. (I should perhaps add that some outstanding philosophers 
are on record as seeing this issue almost exactly as Professor Martin sees it, 
e.g., Hempel, Levi and Jeffrey.) 
To accomplish this, let us first distinguish between three things, namely, 
(1) hypotheses, (2) important features of hypotheses and (3) value imputed to 
those features. Thus, for example, consider Leon Festinger's famous hypothesis: 
(H) Human beings try to remove cognitive dissonance. 
where two things are considered to be in a dissonant relation if "in some way, 
they do not belong together or fit together." Important features of H would 
include such things as how much behavior H explains, how consistent H is 
with experimental evidence, how well H coheres with other theories, laws or 
hypotheses about human motives, how clear or precise H is conceptually, and so 
on. Finally, each of these features may have some value imputed to it, e.g., 
one might say that coherence with other theories is extremely valuable while 
conceptual clarity is somewhat less valuable, or one might say that all important 
features are equally valuable, or something like that. 
Given these fairly innocuous stipulations, I think we can throw some new 
light on the relation of practical values to believing H or some other hypothesis. 
Consider the important feature of hypotheses that we refer to as coherence 
with other hypotheses (i.e., laws, tpeories or well-established beliefs generally). 
Those who have proposed the coherence theory of truth as a criten·on or test 
rather than as a definition of the meaning of the word 'true', have been unani­
mous in their claim that the more coherent our total corpus of  accepted 
hypotheses or beliefs is, the more likely it is that what we believe is true. It is 
very difficult to explain the mechanics of coherence and how coherent sets of 
hypotheses tend to support one another, but the intuition seems to me to be 
certainly on the right track. We recognize the importance of a coherent variety 
of evidence in our courts, our scientific research and in everyday life. We want 
not just lots of different evidence, but lots of different evidence that tends to 
hang together, to point in the same direction as it were. When we obtain such. 
evidence we obtain more support for whatever hypotheses the evidence points 
to. But that is not all. The more evidence, hypotheses, theories, etc., we can 
hang together, the greater is our opportunity to produce an axiomatically 
systematized corpus of knowledg�or at least, of beliefs. Furthermore, when 
we talk of obtaining unified, systematic, axiomatically organized sets of hypo­
theses or beliefs, we are talking about something that is of tremendous practical 
value. The more we can pack into a simple axiomatic system, the easier it is to 
store and systematically recall whatever we have !.here-easier in the purely 
practical senses of saving time, energy, wear and tear on our data processing 
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capabilities, and so on. In short then, this important feature of hypotheses that 
we call 'coherence' may be said to have both practical or pragmatic and 
theoretical or epistemic value. 
At this point you may be able to anticipate the crunch of my argument. Now 
the question is: How should we describe our situation? Should we Say, for 
example: 
or 
(1) A certain feature of say, H, namely, its coherence with other well. 
established beliefs gives it epistemic or theoretical '\lalue in virtue of which 
H is worthy of belief, 
(2) A certain feature of H, namely, its coherence with other well-established 
beliefs gives it pragmatic or practical value in virtue of which H is worthy 
of belief, 
or, finally, 
(3) A certain feature of H, namely, its coherence with other well-established 
beliefs makes H worthy of belier? 
The principle of parsimony or Occam's Razor clearly favors (3), and I am 
100 per cent in agreement. For the case at hand, the choice of either (1) or 
(2) over (3) creates but does not solve any problems at all. Moreover, the choice 
of (1) or (2) tends to turn our fundamental problem completely upside down, 
making it virtually impossible to make progress in this area. For notice that 
before we begin talking about pragmatic and epistemic value, we can talk per­
fectly well about the feature of coherence making H worthy of belief (i.e. 
believable) and useful in systematization. Indeed, our value-talk here seems to be 
entirely parasitic on our feature-talk. It is because a given feature does such and 
such that we say it has such and such value, not the other way around. What 
other criterion do we have to impute pragmatic or epistemic value to any 
feature of a hypothesis? None at all. Thus, it is pointless and highly misleading 
to affirm either (1) or (2). 
Ignoring all of the above, suppose someone did want to affirm (1) or (2). 
What should his choice be'? Clearly, I think, (1) must be regarded as preferable to 
(2) when one considers what it is that epistemic or theoretical values on the one 
hand and pragmatic or practical values on the other are supposed to do or to be 
about. Epistemic values are supposed to be about beliefs, while pragmatic values 
are supposed to be about actions. Hence, a priori we know that one sort of 
value is relevant to belief while the other is not. If this sounds unpersuasive, 
then you see my point exactly. This move is just question-begging. 
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